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Abstract 
Meta-communication has not received much explicit attention in LAP 
literature, but in view of application of the LAP to system specification and 
IC system design, meta-communication needs to be taken seriously: all 
discussion about communication tools (such as languages, but also systems 
dedicated to specific contexts and tasks) involves meta-communication. In 
this article, we discuss the place of meta-communication in the LAP, linking 
it to such subjects as the discussion and discourse layers, the claim to 
comprehensibility and other validity claims, context, and definition theory. 
We also discuss Polanyi’s framework of tacit knowledge and introduce the 
notion of ‘semantic reassurance’. We conclude with a discussion of some 
implications for IC system specification and argue in favour of the support of 
controlled discussion-level meta-communication in future IC systems. 
1. Introduction 
“Meta-communication” is the general term for communication about 
communication that in everyday life is often part and parcel of any conversation. A 
simple request “can you repeat that?” is already a kind of meta-communication, 
and so are requests for clarification and dialogue management  functions such as 
“let us come to a conclusion”. In this article, we focus on meta-communication, 
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placing it in context of a small set of communication-oriented theoretical 
frameworks (most but not all of which have been previously introduced in the LAP 
literature). We will work towards a discussion of some implications for the field of 
information and communication system specification. 
The driving idea behind this article is that specification processes
1 are executed 
by means of a range of language-related techniques and “tools” which enable 
people (and potentially also automated intelligent agents) to communicate about 
means for communication  and, along the same lines, about communication 
systems [Hoppenbrouwers 2000]. Such tools include conceptual devices like 
lexicons, ontologies, syntactic conventions, and conversational conventions. Tool 
selection and design is vital to any engineering effort, and if this holds for 
functional IC system specification as well, communication tools and  modes of 
conversation about them deserve to be taken seriously as such, systematically 
studied, and improved. 
The paper is organized as follows. First we will present an overview of the 
discussion concerning meta-communication in LAP literature so far. Central to the 
discussion will be such topics as Van Reijswoud’s model of the Discussion Layer, 
Conversation for Clarification, and the place of Definition in Speech Act Theory 
(section 2). Next, we will further explore some fundamental aspects of 
conversation for clarification, relating it to Polanyi’s ideas on tacit knowledge and 
to the introduction of the notion of semantic reassurance (section 3). We conclude 
by discussing  some implications of the matters presented for IC systems 
specification (section 4). 
This article is for a large part related to ongoing PhD research 
[Hoppenbrouwers, in progress; Hoppenbrouwers 2000], and has an explorative 
character. We are aware that consolidation of our ideas through confrontation with 
the practice of IC system design/use is called for, and plan to include an empirical 
component into our continuing research, to back up our theoretical ideas. 
2.  Meta-communication in the Language-Action Perspective 
“Meta-communication” is the general term for communication about 
communication. It is most typically viewed as taking place at breakdown (ex post 
meta-communication), but any toolkit or system designed to support 
communication implies anticipation of breakdown, and pro-active discussion about 
communication (ex ante meta communication). As an explicit topic, meta-
communication has so far received little attention in generally available LAP 
literature, though ‘between the lines’ reference to meta-communication can be 
found in abundance. The one notable exception is the work of [Schoop 1998; 
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1999], who explicitly mentions “the metalinguistic level” [1999:65] but does not 
address the matter from a broad perspective, focusing mostly on the need for 
clarification of terminology and ‘translation’ between professional groups. While 
similar fundamental matters underlie Schoop’s discussion as well as ours, we hope 
to present a somewhat wider view on meta-communication, linking explicit 
conversation about language and definition to various modes of specification. 
Central to our discussion will be the discussion layer and discourse layer 
described by [van Reijswoud 1996] as part of his Transaction Process Model 
(TPM), and their relation to conversation for clarification which concerns the 
claim to comprehensibility [Habermas 1981; Schoop 1998, 1999]. 
First a classic quotation [Winograd and Flores 1986:66]: “Conditions of 
satisfaction are not objective realities, free of interpretations of speaker and hearer. 
They exist in the listening, and there is always the potential for a difference among 
the parties. This can lead to breakdown […] and to a subsequent conversation 
about the understanding of the conditions.”  
Most typically, if communicative transactions fail this is because there is 
disagreement about some aspect of the propositional content, which is at least 
successfully communicated. However, the propositional content may not come 
across successfully in the first place. In such a case, there are three main 
possibilities: 
 
·  Immediate breakdown occurs on account of clearly perceived 
incomprehensibility of some utterance; 
·  The listening/reading party suspects incorrect interpretation on her behalf, 
because of a perceived mismatch between what is said and what is to be 
expected in the wider context of the conversation. She may or may not start a 
conversation for clarification; 
·  No misunderstanding is perceived and problems may arise only later, if at all. 
 
We will focus on those cases in which the listener expresses the suspected 
occurrence of comprehensibility failure and thus enters into a conversation for 
clarification  [cf. Winograd 1988]. We are concerned here not only with 
clarification based on incomprehensibility of the propositional content, but also of 
expressions of illocutionary force [Schoop 1999:65]. We thus include all cases in 
which the language/utterance used notably fails to do its intended communicative 
job. In sections 2 and 3, we mostly (but not exclusively) take as central breakdown 
as it occurs in actual language use; we put anticipation of breakdown central in 
section 4. S. Hoppenbrouwers and H. Weigand 
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2.1  Discussion, Discourse, and Text about Communication 
In Van Reijswoud’s Transaction Process Model [1996:95], three layers of 
conversation are distinguished: the Success Layer, the Discussion-and-Failure 
Layer (further called “Discussion Layer” in this paper), and the Discourse Layer. 
The Success Layer is where transactions take place that do not suffer breakdown. 
If, however, breakdown occurs (or threatens), the Discussion Layer is entered. At 
this level, “the participants in a communicatively oriented transaction process 
discuss whether the claims incorporated in a communication act and laid down in a 
transaction state are true,  justifiable [elsewhere called appropriate], and truthful” 
[italics added] [1996:97]. “However, in some situations a discussion relates to the 
background conditions of a group of related transaction processes. These 
discussions, called discourses [italics added], are dealt with in the discourse-layer 
[…].” [1996:100]. “Discussions about validity claims, on the one hand, relate to a 
particular instance of a transaction type, e.g. the order with the order #93154. 
Discourses, on the other hand, abstract from particular instances of a transaction 
type, and focus on the underlying rules of a particular transaction type.” 
[1996:165]. 
Meta-communication can be placed in this model without much trouble. 
Conversation about the meaning of a term, for example, can occur for clarification 
of communication taking place in the success-layer. Important is that at discussion 
level, statements are made concerning the meaning of X in context. There is an 
enormous difference in interpretive depth between an isolated linguistic expression 
(for example, a sentence) and a fully contextualised utterance including that 
sentence, and evoking an interpretation [cf. Dik, 1989]. Discussion for 
clarification concerns a particular utterance in some context, which is complex and 
may be for a large part implicit. Because it is contextualised, it is difficult to 
anticipate and is a hard subject for ex ante (anticipatory) meta communication. 
There is a correspondence between instantiated (contextualised) linguistic 
utterances and conversation at Discussion level. 
Discourse for clarification, on the other hand, typically involves more 
fundamental and persistent, ‘decontextualised’ issues, grounded in communal rules 
and norms, which are more general since they cover a type of situation rather than 
one particular, instantiated situation. In this sense, there is a parallel between 
generic elements of language (general word level, syntax) and the Discourse level 
in that they both involve community-based rules and norms [Weigand and 
Hoppenbrouwers 1998]. Discourse level is therefore also likely to be the primary 
arena for ex ante meta communication. 
If semantically rich, contextualised meanings are evoked by linguistic 
utterances using more generic elements, then it can be argued that such generic 
elements are communally grounded tools used to evoke contextualised meanings in 
individuals. Such a functionalist perspective on language [Dik 1989, Harder 1994,                                        Meta-communication in the Language Action Perspective 
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Weigand and Hoppenbrouwers 1998, Hoppenbrouwers 2000] implies not only that 
linguistic form is seen as ‘being used to evoke meaning’, but also that this involves 
social construction of signs (combinations of form and meaning). This is in line 
with the semiotic and language-action perspectives. As [van Reijswoud 1996:45] 
explains: “a constructivist principle assumes that meanings are constructed, and 
continuously tested and repaired, through people using syntactic structures to 
organize their coordinated action. The repair is taking place when they judge that 
the language action relationships have failed.” We agree on this, and consider 
meta-communication to concern such ‘repair’, or else construction in anticipation 
of breakdown. 
As said, we follow Van Reijswoud (and ultimately [Stamper 1993]) in 
embracing a semiotic point of view, and the distinction between a number of 
semiotic domains (the ‘Semiological Ladder’, cf. figure 1). 
 
Physical world 
   (Empirics) 
    Syntax 
     Semantics 
      Pragmatics 
       (Social  World) 
Figure 1: the Semiological Ladder (Stamper 1993) 
In the physical world, signs are examined as phenomena: physical properties of 
signals and marks are studied. At the empirics level, statistical properties of signs 
are studied. Syntax is concerned with rules composing complex signs from simple 
ones, focusing on form. The semantic domain is concerned with the meaning of 
signs. The pragmatic domain is concerned with the relationships between used 
signs and the resulting behaviour of responsible agents in a social context. In the 
social world, the focus lies on actual, or perlocutionary effects [Van Reijswoud 
1996:45]. 
Let us return to the discussion and discourse layers in van Reijswoud’s TPM. 
Various kinds of breakdown may send a conversation into the discussion layer. 
The type we are concerned with concerns a failure (or suspected failure) in one of 
the domains of the semiological ladder. In this paper, as we have nothing in 
particular to say about the Social World and the Empirics layer, we will further 
discard these levels, and for now assume a four level semiotic model. Breakdown 
(or anticipated breakdown) in either of the levels may trigger meta-
communication. In other words, once breakdown in any of these layers occurs, 
discussion follows: 
 S. Hoppenbrouwers and H. Weigand 
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  Physical: discussion about the material markers/signals used: “Why don’t 
you use email instead of a fax?” “Speak up, please, I cannot hear you”. The 
physical level is strongly related to the notion ‘media’. 
  Syntactic: discussion about correct formulation whereby syntactic rules are 
the cause of confusion, as in the following example: “Two cars were 
reported stolen by the Aachen police yesterday”. 
  Semantic: any discussion about the meaning of some sign (word, or even 
sentence –a complex sign): “What do you mean here by …” (contextual); 
“What does … mean? (general)”. 
  Pragmatic: meta-linguistic discussion about pragmatic concerns questions 
like “Do you really mean you want me to …” about some pragmatic 
interpretation. Note that meta-communication about pragmatics should not 
be confused with discussion about e.g. a claim to appropriateness 
concerning some linguistic act. It purely concerns correct  interpretation.  
 
If the validity claims challenged and discussed in the Discussion Layer are not 
agreed upon, in most cases the transaction will simply fail and be broken off. 
However, it is also possible that as a result of the discussion of a specific utterance 
in context, more general questions are raised, and the communal norms and rules 
underlying the discussion are subject of conversation in the Discourse Layer. 
Examples of questions raised in such discourse might be: 
  Physical: can you use email for confidential information?  
  Syntactic: should the *-sign have priority over “/”? (example from 
arithmetic)  
  Semantic: does term X really mean Y in the common vocabulary of 
language L?  
  Pragmatic: is illocutionary marker M really commonly understood as 
giving 
            illocutionary force I to utterance U in language L? 
 
Because the discourse layer concerns communal norms and rules, it may 
involve any text known to the community in which such norms and rules are 
described [cf. Weigand et al., 1999]. Dictionaries are the most straightforward 
example, but similar texts are also imaginable at other semiotic levels (grammar 
books, interaction protocols, guidelines for the use of materials and 
communication equipment). Note that in cases where a set of norms and rules used 
is mostly based on NL, those norms and rules are mostly left implicit, but that in 
more restricted, artificial communicational set-ups, norms, rules, standards, and 
explicit descriptions or definitions thereof are imaginable and indeed occur across 
all semiotic layers. This is especially and increasingly the case in environments in 
which information and communication technology is deployed. Note that such                                        Meta-communication in the Language Action Perspective 
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texts often play a role in active construction of language rather than just making 
implicit rules and norms explicit. 
2.2  Validity Claims and Comprehensibility 
Consider the following illustrative dialogue from Lewis Carroll’s Through the 
Looking Glass: 
 
HD:   ‘there's glory for you!’ (assertion, still in the success layer) 
A:  ‘I don't know what you mean by “glory,”’ (objection; conversation is taken into the 
discussion layer)  
HD:  ‘Of course you don’t -- till I tell you.’ (indicates individual (stipulative) perspective on 
meaning) 
‘I meant “there’s a nice knock-down argument for you!”’ (explicit clarification) 
A:    ‘But “glory” doesn’t mean  “a nice knock-down argument,”’ (objection. Claim to truth? 
Appropriateness?) 
HD:  ‘When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’ (meta-
meta claim, discourse level) 
A:  ‘The question is whether you can make words mean so many different things.’  (challenge 
of meta-meta claim) 
HD:  ‘The question is which is to be master -- that's all.’ (claim to power)  
 
Comprehensibility of utterances expressing the semantics which in turn ‘serve 
to carry out some goal’ (pragmatics), is crucial to the communicative effort as a 
whole. Nevertheless, the status of comprehensibility in speech act theory varies. 
For example, in some discussions of validity claims underlying transactions [e.g. 
Van Reijswoud 1996], the claim to comprehensibility as introduced by [Habermas 
1981] is not adopted. [Schoop 1998; 1999:65-6], however, does adopt it, and 
argues it is relevant to all five types of speech act (Assertive, Commissive, 
Directive, Expressive, Declarative) and both related to Propositional Content and 
Illocutionary Force. We side with Schoop in adopting the claim to 
comprehensibility, but discuss it in relation to other validity claims, and to the 
semiotic levels. 
As for the relation between the Comprehensibility claim on the one hand, and 
the claims to Power, Truth, Truthfulness, and Appropriateness on the other, we 
believe there is more to it than a division in five types if meta-communication is 
concerned. Once the claim to comprehensibility is challenged and a conversation 
for clarification is entered (‘I don't know what you mean by “glory,”’), we enter into a 
new linguistic domain in which terminology but possibly also all other aspects of 
language are tuned to meta-communication. Such a conversation has its own 
dynamics and properties, which may be quite different from those active at the 
level of the ‘success layer’, including all four validity claims and authority 
structures. It is therefore not enough to associate meta-communication with the 
claim to comprehensibility alone. Let us illustrate this by considering examples of S. Hoppenbrouwers and H. Weigand 
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claims concerning all five validity claims. For sake of the argument, we will 
discuss them in a somewhat unusual order, Comprehensibility last. 
Power in meta-communication may seem a difficult claim to substantiate, 
because thought control is not something that can be easily exerted, and meaning 
is a hard thing to ‘control’ in the best of circumstances. However, the claim to 
power can certainly be made, realistically or not, and up to a certain point 
successfully. Texts can play a role here, but as we have seen they can only enforce 
a skeletal, decontextualised form of communicational norms and rules. At the 
Discussion level, power is most easily exerted. If one of the communicating 
parties, for example, makes the claim to power (Humpty Dumpty: ‘The question is 
which is to be master - - that’s all.’), and the other party (Alice, who is a polite English 
girl), does not want to break off the conversation, then the latter is forced to adopt 
the meaning of a word at least for the duration of the conversation; yet she can 
‘drop’ that meaning the moment it ends. Note that a situation is possible in which 
power is exerted at the meta-communicational level, while at the same time no 
such power can be exerted in other respects. 
Whether in meta-communication truth of some element of language (for 
example, the meaning of a word) can be questioned at all is already matter of 
debate. Can some word meaning be fundamentally ‘true’ or not?  Is it possible to 
identify a ‘false illocutionary act’? One of the oldest questions in philosophy is on 
the debate between nominalism and realism. Where realism asserts that concepts 
exist somehow in reality, nominalism accepts the existence of individual objects 
only; in this perspective, words are arbitrary signs denoting some set of objects. 
Another question is whether reality has to be reduced to the objective-scientific 
abstraction of it. A complete overview of these questions is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but in section 3 we will consider some answers provided by Polanyi.  
In explicit meta-communication about meaning, claims are perhaps most 
typically based on its social use. Language is (at least from one point of view) an 
inherently social phenomenon ([Habermas 1981], among many others), and it is 
therefore reasonable to base claims concerning word meaning or use of grammar 
on appropriateness. General usage dictionaries are based on this principle, and if 
sufficient authority is attributed to such an explicit text describing word meaning, a 
certain meaning of a word may even become mandatory. But even if linguistic 
conventions are left implicit (as is usually the case), they are crucial in 
communication because language is based on common ground between language 
users [Weigand and Hoppenbrouwers, 1998]. 
Linguistic conventions may play a crucial role in language, but the 
interpretation aspect of communication, which in our view goes in fact far beyond 
language as such [Winograd and Flores 1986, Harder 1996, Weigand et al. 1999], 
has also a very individual, subjective component in it. Apart for a claim to 
appropriateness, therefore, discussing meaning often involves a subjective opinion, 
and meta-communication an attempt to get across such an opinion. In these cases,                                        Meta-communication in the Language Action Perspective 
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the central claim is truthfulness: whether or not someone is sincere about what she 
‘feels’ a word to mean. Note that though such a claim can in principle concern 
general usage of a word, it will most likely be made in context. 
So what about comprehensibility? It is violation of the claim to 
comprehensibility which may trigger discussion about communication, i.e. meta-
communication. However, also at the level of meta-communication, the claim to 
comprehensibility holds. Since meta-communication needs a language of its own, 
it is not impossible that this language, and utterances composed using it, include 
elements not shared by all parties involved, which may lead to breakdown, (meta-) 
meta-discussion, etc.  
Summarizing the validity claims as applied to meta-communication: 
 
power:     X means Y because I say so 
 
truth:      X means Y because that’s the way it is 
truthfulness:     X means Y because I can’t imagine anything else (so that’s 
the way it is) 
appropriateness:   X means Y because everyone uses X that way (so that’s the 
way it is) 
 
comprehensibility:  You know what ‘mean’ means 
 
But what about the meta level in meta-communication? Should 
communicational rules and norms be community based or may they be enforced 
by a power-exerting party? “Can we make words mean so many different things?” 
Discussion of such norms and rules applying to meta-communication, whether 
they exist in a particular context or in general use, is meta-meta-communication. 
Whereas various claims are made in meta-communication, we do not know yet 
whether there is one claim that prevails. To answer this question, we will proceed 
by first discussing some types of word definition.  
2.3  Definition as a Speech Act 
One of the central activities in meta-language discussion is definition, most 
typically definition of word meaning. Quite appropriately, this immediately calls 
for a definition of ‘definition’. Here is a nice one taken from (Vanderveken 1990; 
also mentioned in Viskil 1994:134) (although we will see shortly that it lumps 
various different kinds of definition together in one): 
 
 " To define is to declare, by way of stipulating, the meaning of a word in a 
certain linguistic context (e.g. a text or a conversation). From the moment 
of utterance, the word or phrase defined is taken to have the meaning S. Hoppenbrouwers and H. Weigand 
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thereby given (propositional content condition). […] A definition can fix 
the sense as well as the denotation of a linguistic expression." 
 
Below we present a speech-act related, functionalist view on definition as put 
forward by Viskil (1994), as a concluding part of his elaborate and in-depth 
discussion of definition. Some of the findings mentioned by Viskil (most relevant 
to this paper) are: 
 
  “Precision of definition is always connected to a certain goal or a certain 
context. No statement can be expected to hold absolutely or universally; 
only that it is precise enough for the goal and context for which it was 
brought forward” (1994:3) [translated from Dutch].  
  “The break-off point of definition is determined intersubjectively: language 
users participating in communication together decide whether enough 
clarity has been achieved –for what they want to achieve” (1994:3). 
 
Viskil, after a thorough comparison of many accounts of definition, 
distinguishes four main types of definition:  
 
Stipulative definition: speech-act type = language use clarification; records 
word meaning with the purpose of clarifying (statement).  For example, 
“With X, I mean Y”; the definition concerns a particular instance of use of 
a word; the person defining describes subjectively what the word means to 
her. 
Lexical definition: speech-act type = language use assertion; describes word 
meaning as attached to a word in usage by language users (observation). 
For example, “In Dutch, X means Y”; the definition concerns the meaning 
of a word as it is perceived by ‘people in general’; de person defining takes 
an objective attitude.  
Stipulative-lexical definition: speech-act type = language use clarification 
through language use assertion: combines stipulative and lexical definition 
in that it is an assertion (statement) about word meaning explicitly 
grounded in observed usage. For example: “X means Y in Dutch, and 
therefore it also means Y in this particular case”; the definition concerns a 
particular instance of use of a word, but the person defining chooses to 
stick to the ‘common’ meaning; the subjective agent conforms to previous 
objective observation defined meaning, usually as expressed in some 
authoritative dictionary.  
Factual definition: speech-act type = assertion; empirical description of a 
fact; not meta-language. A definition-like description is used to explain 
some object, situation, state, process, etc.; however, such a definition has 
no meta-communicational function.                                        Meta-communication in the Language Action Perspective 
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Further discarding factual definition (which does not concern meta-
communication), there are some interesting relations between various aspects of 
meta-language as previously discussed and Viskil’s definition types: 
 
Figure 2: Relations between definition types and some meta-communication 
properties 
We distinguish discussions on the meaning of a concept from discussions on the 
reference of a term. In [Weigand and Hoppenbrouwers, 1998], it is argued, in line 
with Functional Grammar, that a speaker uttering a term performs many linguistic 
acts: he not only utters words, but also (by uttering a word or idiom) evokes a 
concept and (by expressing a term, consisting of a category and restrictors) refers 
to some entity (that satisfies the conditions that the speaker puts into the term). A 
question about concept evocation is a question about meaning (definition). A 
question about the reference of a term is a question about denotation 
(interpretation).  
According to Vanderveken (see above), the illocutionary force of a definition is 
declarative. This would imply that a definition does not make a truth claim. In the 
next section, we will go into the nature of a definition, which is closely intertwined 
with our view on knowledge and concepts.  
Without going into the detail here, we must remark that in organizational 
contexts, definitions are often heavily loaded with normative statements. Think 
about the definition of an employee, or of a staff member. If a definition influences 
the obligations and authorizations of the members of the organization, then the 
definition makes a claim about the appropriateness or rightness of these 
obligations. A discussion about such a claim has to be distinguished from a 
conversation for clarification proper. 
3. Conversation for Clarification 
We will now elaborate on some mechanisms fundamental to conversation for 
clarification. As mentioned, interpretation in context involves implicit information 
concerning that context, which is not carried by language as such. To clarify the 
link between implicit (tacit) and explicit interpretation, we will present helpful 
definition 
scope  prevailing claim  TPM layer 
lexical  general Truth  discourse 
stipulative  in context  Truthfulness  discussion 
stip-lex  in context  Appropriateness  discussion S. Hoppenbrouwers and H. Weigand 
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ideas put forward by [Polanyi 1958, 1969] concerning tacit and explicit 
knowledge. We take Polanyi’s view on knowledge and its tacit component as a 
starting point. 
3.1 The tacit dimension 
When developing their hypotheses regarding knowledge creation, [Nonaka and 
Takeuchi 1995] draw heavily on the distinctions between explicit and tacit 
knowledge made by Polanyi. It should be recognized, however, that Polanyi 
assumes knowledge to exist on a spectrum where all knowledge has a tacit 
dimension. ‘Tacit’ is opposed to ‘explicit’ or ‘conscious’. “We can know more 
than we can tell” [Polanyi 1958:95]. The reason for this is that knowledge, 
according to Polanyi, is first of all acquired by our body and the daily activities we 
are engaged in. Therefore, it is not only often impossible to externalise this 
knowledge – think of an attempt to explain someone how to ride a bike – but also 
not desirable. Knowledge is something that resides within us, and manifests itself 
through our actions, and we therefore do not need to document it for our own sake. 
We just use it. Should we have to express our tacit knowledge in words, it would 
not be for our own sake but for the benefits of someone else in our organization or 
community. Again, according to Polanyi, all knowledge has a tacit dimension. For 
riding a bike, this dimension prevails. But in many organizational tasks, there is 
both a tacit and an explicit dimension; the explicit dimension (e.g. business rules) 
lends itself to inclusion in an automated system. 
According to Polanyi, tacit knowledge has two distinct properties: distal and 
proximal (also see [Stenmark, 2000]). The proximal term is the part that is ‘closer’ 
to us, while the distal part is ‘further away’. He exemplifies this by describing how 
the police helps a witness who is unable to describe a perpetrator to create a 
phantom picture by selecting pictures from a large selection of human features 
such as eyes, noses and hair. By attending from the first, closer image that resides 
within (tacit), to the second, more distant picture collection, the witness is able to 
communicate her awareness of the face.  
What does this mean for language? Polanyi views language as just another 
bodily action [Polanyi 1969:193]. It also involves relying on our subsidiary 
awareness of some things (for example, the syllables) for the purpose of attending 
focally to a matter on which they bear (the sentence meaning). Only in the case of 
a breakdown, the speaker can focus his attention on certain parts, but then he 
cannot focus anymore on the whole. However, Polanyi also accepts at least a weak 
form of the Whorfian view that our thinking is heavily dependent on language: 
 
“In learning a language, every child accepts a culture constructed on the 
premises of the traditional interpretation of the universe, rooted in the 
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educated mind will be made within this frame of reference. Man’s whole 
intellectual life would be thrown away should this interpretative framework 
be false” [Polanyi 1958:112]. 
 
Yet this commitment to the centrality of language in our thought does not make 
him a logicist. In relationship to our tacit knowledge of concepts as proximal term, 
language is the distal term. It provides clues for the communicating subjects, but 
does not describe the meaning exhaustively. This holds both for normal sentence 
meanings and for lexical definitions. In our view, Polanyi in this respect comes 
very close to the functionalist perspective on language [also see Hoppenbrouwers 
2000]. 
According to Dik’s Functional Grammar [Dik 1989:81-], meaning definitions 
are to be given in natural language and he discards any logical description of 
conceptual meaning in some formal meta-language. The problem with these meta-
languages is not only that they need to be grounded again, since it cannot be 
maintained that they are self-evident, but also that they ignore the tacit dimension 
and  assume from the outset that a set of necessary and sufficient meaning 
conditions can be found. Dik supports the use of meaning definitions in natural 
language but emphasizes that these definitions will not provide an exhaustive 
definition. We could say that the criterion is not whether the concept is described 
completely, but whether it is described sufficiently for linguistic purposes. We call 
this the functionality principle. For a structuralist this would mean: in order to be 
able to distinguish the term from sister terms. For example, in the definition of 
“lending” as opposed to giving or selling, the features “for money” and 
“temporarily” are significant. In the spirit of Polanyi the functionality principle 
would mean: in order to be able to communicate and evoke the right tacit 
knowledge: “is it a useful clue?” As far as lexical definitions are concerned, 
Polanyi can afford to be quite liberal. A metaphor or story can be as revealing as a 
list of properties. He can be that liberal because the definition is just a vehicle for 
communication and thinking, not a complete articulation. 
Finally, it must be remarked that Polanyi is still a realist. Not in the Platonic 
sense, believing that concepts exist somewhere outside as ideal entities, but in the 
sense that the structure and order of (tacit) knowledge reflect structures and 
orderings in reality. In that sense, definitions make a claim to truth. An example 
[Polanyi 1958:111] is the scientific discussion in the 1930s on the definition of 
isotopes after the discovery of heavy hydrogen. Heavy hydrogen did not obey the 
meaning conditions of isotopes as elements chemically inseparable from each 
other. But the result of the discussion was that it was generally felt that hence the 
definition should be modified or, one could say, sharpened. “This demonstrates the 
principle which must guide us when adapting the meaning of words, so that what 
we say shall be true: the corresponding conceptual decisions must be right- their 
implied allegations true”. In the course of time, meanings are adapted when we S. Hoppenbrouwers and H. Weigand 
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learn more. “Languages are the product of man’s groping for words in the process 
of making new conceptual decisions, to be conveyed by words”.  
3.2 Semantic Reassurance 
Depending on the argumentative framework that is used, different foundations of 
discussions about meaning will be deemed necessary or satisfactory. Very often, 
just exchanging statements (‘X means Y’) is enough to reach consensus (often it is 
really just clarification: one party asking for more information). In this case, the 
argumentation form (using Toulmin’s theory of argumentation) is as follows: 
 
Claim  
->  X means Y 
Data (on wich the claim is founded)   
-> X evokes Y with me 
Warrant (fundamental, non-inferential justification)   
-> Paraphrasing (Xp) shows recurrent evocation of Y by Xp.  
 
‘Proof by paraphrasing’ is subjective, but a sincere person will be honest in 
answering the question ‘do X and Xp both mean Y for me’. Semantic claims on an 
individual level are never decisive. Semantic claims on a social level may be, but 
authority is then derived by quantitative means (enough people agree). 
Individual meaning is very much association-based. A certain sign evokes a 
certain association (the proximal term). Also, this is a matter of explicitness: a 
concept can only be ‘seen’ once it is made explicit through some sort of language, 
where we hope that this representation evokes the same interpretation as intended. 
Note that some degree of dissatisfaction in explicitly expressing some concept is 
commonplace. 
A primary way of making ‘sure’ that X means Y for an individual, or rather 
means Y for various individuals (the communicating parties), is to express the 
particular bit of meaning in various ways, not only directly but by various means 
of expression that all trigger a certain, important aspect of that concept. This 
includes semantic relations such as PART-OF, ISA, antonyms, etc. It is important 
to see that such exemplary conceptualizations are presented in the context (with 
the goal) of finding one isolated bit of meaning. Once enough examples intended 
to evoke a particular bit of meaning seem to indeed invoke a certain bit, the 
individuals will become more and more reassured that that particular meaning is 
meant. This all hinges around a question we assume every individual has, so to 
speak, in the back of her/his mind: how likely is it that all these different ways of 
evoking one specific association indeed render an identical association while it is 
still a ‘wrong’ association (i.e. differing crucially from that of the other party)? 
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If the conceptual meaning cannot be fixed in one step, a process of stepwise 
lexical decomposition [Dik, 1989] can be followed. This implies that some simpler 
underlying concepts are defined first. Once these are assured, they can be used to 
assure the meaning of the focal concept. Note that “simpler” does not mean “more 
abstract” (higher in a generalization hierarchy) but closer to the basic level of 
everyday knowledge. 
Procedures to establish semantic reassurance presuppose that the person in 
question already knows the concept (or underlying concepts) tacitly. If this is not 
the case, the procedure will fail. The partners have to decide whether the issue is 
essential or can be ignored. If it is essential,  some form of learning procedure 
must start, for example, by giving the person in question hands-on experience 
(real-life, by means of video, or a story).  A good reason to ignore the issue could 
be reliance on the division of linguistic labour, as [Putnam 1975] called it. 
According to Putnam, ordinary people do not know the exact procedure to 
determine the true extension of concepts such as “gold”, or “uranium”, but they 
still distinguish  these concepts because they rely on the fact that experts, such as 
chemists, have a means to keep them apart. 
4. Meta-communication and ICT Systems Specification 
As we have seen, meta-communication very directly concerns communication 
about ‘communication tools’. Considering communication tools at large (including 
the whole range from NL to specialised ICT applications), there is a gliding scale 
from quite generally applicable tools (e.g. the basics of NL) to highly specialised 
tools (like a database or a workflow engine) which support a very particular kind 
of situationally adjusted communication. In principle, every IC system can be seen 
as a complex communication tool dedicated to specific purposes [cf. Winograd 
and Flores 1986:155]; a purpose-specific language. Therefore, talking about 
communication systems functionality falls under our definition of meta-
communication, more specifically ex ante meta-communication. Though it is has 
not been so explicitly stated in the LAP literature, this idea has always been an 
implicit part of the LAP enterprise. However, making it explicit, and looking at it 
more closely, some questions come to mind as to how meta-communication relates 
to system specification and design. 
Winograd and Flores make it clear that anticipation and prevention of 
communication breakdown should be at the core of IC system design. Meta 
communication is an inherent part of the design process of any information and 
communication system. A system, being fixed (a text), dictates the language that 
system users have to work with; design of such a system involves ex ante 
discourse about and construction of that language. 
 [Winograd and Flores 1986:156]: “In a computer-mediated system (as opposed 
to direct communicational action), it is difficult to maintain […] the potential for a S. Hoppenbrouwers and H. Weigand 
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dialog in the face of breakdown”. [1986:158]: “New computer-based 
communication technology can help anticipate and avoid breakdowns. It is 
impossible to completely avoid breakdowns by design […]. But we can partially 
anticipate situations where breakdowns are likely to occur […] and we can provide 
people with the tools and the procedures they need to cope with them.” 
However, practical consequences for IC system specification and design 
derived from this perspective only include anticipation of breakdown (ex ante 
meta-communication). Yet in any situation where background information and 
interpretation play a role, breakdown threatens [also see Hoppenbrouwers 2000]. 
Given that in such situations, breakdown can not always be accurately predicted, 
ex post meta communication should be considered as a potential solution to the 
problem.  
In view of a growing demand for more flexible IC systems, it becomes more 
and more interesting to provide means for the user to specify (where necessary and 
if possible) certain properties of the system she works with. For example, 
specification of ad hoc workflow [cf. Hoppenbrouwers, in progress] and other ad 
hoc activities cannot be expected to be a  part of the design phase. 
It is neither possible nor desirable to explicitly conceptualise and communicate 
at every level of abstraction. For example, for a piano player to make explicit and 
talk about all her intricate finger movements is not only of little use, but it also 
interferes with her capacity to play fluently. Explicit conceptualisation may raise 
barriers for some types of action, for example those involving our muscular and 
nervous systems at a very low, ‘physical’ level. Care should be taken that such a 
level is not touched upon in conceptual system specification, but that only higher 
levels of abstraction are entered which lend themselves to constructive linguistic 
expression. 
If specification of IC systems is considered in view of specification techniques 
that are currently common practice (e.g. formal conceptual modelling, scenario-
based requirements engineering), it may well seem a rather naive idea to introduce 
‘run-time specification’ by users rather than pre-use design and iterated upgrades. 
However, there are opportunities for the development of techniques for the support 
of more informal meta-communication. Such techniques might aim for semantic 
reassurance in a controlled and goal-oriented, systematic way, building on 
previously determined concepts engrained in the system. Feedback of such 
discussion level meta-communication may eventually be carried on at discourse 
level (involving system managers) and so influence the more fundamental system 
specifications inspired by actual use of concepts, but it may also simply play a role 
in the solution of ‘local’ breakdown due to violation of comprehensibility. 
In [Schoop 1998:129] it is claimed that “In routine interaction, 
comprehensibility problems are usually solved by rephrasing and translating. 
These problems can be easily overcome in face-to-face communication. However, 
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for comprehensibility problems. There must be some kind of rephrasing according 
to the different requirements in order to avoid a breakdown due to non-
comprehensibility.” As a solution of observed problems of this kind in a case 
involving digital communication between two professional groups (doctors and 
nurses), [Schoop 1999:65] proposes  a ‘translation system’ taking care of 
terminological differences between the groups. Such a translation system is an 
excellent example of an application that both takes the communally determined 
language apparatus seriously, and will involve a great deal of (ex ante) meta-
communication to develop. As argued, however, a translation system will still fail 
in some circumstances requiring immediate response to breakdown. In such cases, 
a dedicated system helping agents involved in reaching quick semantic reassurance 
or possibly a working definition may be very valuable indeed. 
Run-time specification of meaningful structures used in communication can be 
expected to become an increasingly desirable capacity of IC systems as inter-
organisational and distributed digital communication increases (e-business, inter-
organisational workflow, etc.). While run-time specification cannot be expected to 
work miracles (given the limited capacity, motivation and resources of most users 
as well as implementation problems), it may push systems into a level of flexibility 
and semantic accuracy not achievable through traditional ‘pre-specification’ in the 
design phase. Once we understand the basic problems facing run-time 
specification in an IC systems context, which concern (at least in part) meta-
communication, we may be able to develop dedicated support mechanisms for it. 
Some of our future research will develop along these lines. Note, however, that we 
consider it absolutely vital for such a discussion-level mechanism to be closely 
linked to discourse level and pre-specification, both procedurally (in terms of 
system modelling and maintenance) and conceptually (conforming to and 
complementing the more rigid, formalised conceptual structures of the system).  
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